Abstract. Boneh and Venkatesan have recently proposed a polynomial time algorithm for recovering a "hidden" element α of a finite field Fp of p elements from rather short strings of the most significant bits of the remainder modulo p of αt for several values of t selected uniformly at random from F * p . Unfortunately the applications to the computational security of most significant bits of private keys of some finite field exponentiation based cryptosystems given by Boneh and Venkatesan are not quite correct. For the Diffie-Hellman cryptosystem the result of Boneh and Venkatesan has been corrected and generalized in our recent paper. Here a similar analysis is given for the Shamir message passing scheme. The results depend on some bounds of exponential sums.
Introduction
Let p be an n-bit prime and let F p be a field of p elements. For integers s and q ≥ 1 we denote by (s rem q) the remainder of s on division by q. We also use log z to denote the binary logarithm of z > 0.
The Shamir message passing scheme can be described in the following way (see [1] , as well as Protocol 12.22 from [9] ).
To Given a primitive root g ∈ F p , Boneh and Venkatesan [1] have proposed a method of recovering a "hidden" element α ∈ F p from about n 1/2 most significant bits of (αg xi rem p), i = 1, . . . , d, for d = 2n 1/2 integers x 1 , . . . , x d , chosen uniformly and independently at random in the interval [0, p − 2]. This result has been applied to proving security of reasonably small portions of bits of private keys of several cryptosystems. In particular, Theorem 3 of [1] claims the security of the n 1/2 + log n most significant bits of the message in the Shamir message passing scheme.
Unfortunately the proof of this result is not quite correct because the exponent x of the corresponding multiplier g x (where g will in fact be m b , m and b chosen in the scheme) must satisfy the additional condition gcd(bx + 1, p − 1) = 1; thus g x runs through some special subset of F * p (even if g is a primitive root) rather than through the whole F * p and therefore Theorem 1 of [1] does not apply. The proof of Theorem 2 in [1] , dealing with security of most significant bits of the Diffie-Hellman key, suffers from a similar problem. In [3] the result of Theorem 1 of [1] has been extended to the case when g is not necessarily a primitive root but an element of multiplicative order T , provided that T ≥ p 1/3+ε for any prime p and T ≥ p ε for almost all p. It has also been shown that this statement allows us to close the gap in the proof of Theorem 2 of [1] . Namely it is shown that by having an oracle which computes n 1/2 + log n most significant bits of the private key g ab rem p from the values of the public keys A = (g a rem p) and B = g b rem p one can construct a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm for computing the whole key g ab rem p for all pairs (a, b)
2 , where T is the multiplicative order of g. The method of [3] relies on some bounds of exponential sums and results about the distribution of exponential functions in residue classes. Here we use a similar approach to study the bit security of the Shamir message passing scheme.
A survey of similar results for other functions of cryptographic interest has recently been given in [2] .
We denote by ν(k) the number of distinct prime divisors and by ϕ(k) the Euler function of k ≥ 2.
Throughout the paper the implied constants in symbols 'O' may occasionally, where obvious, depend on the small positive parameter ε and are absolute otherwise; they all are effective and can be explicitly evaluated.
Distribution of exponential functions modulo p
As in [3] the following bound of exponential sums plays the central role in our arguments.
Let e(z) = exp(2πiz/p). The following estimate is well known (see the proof of Lemma 2 in [7] or Theorem 8.2 in [11] 
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Proof. Let µ(k) denote the Möbius function. We recall that µ(1) = 1, µ(k) = 0 if k ≥ 2 is not square-free and µ(k) = (−1) ν(k) otherwise. Using the Möbius function µ(d) over the divisors of p−1 to detect the co-primality condition and interchanging the order of summation, we obtain (see Section 3.d of Chapter 2 of [14] )
Denoting by τ d the multiplicative order of
Taking into account that
(see Section 3.b of Chapter 2 of [14] ), we obtain the desired result.
For integers λ, b, r and h let us denote by
We need the following asymptotic formula which shows that N λ,b (r, h) is close to its expected value ϕ(p − 1)h/p.
Lemma 2.3. For any
Proof. We remark that N λ,b (r, h) is the number of solutions of the congruence
Using the identity (see Exercise 11.a in Chapter 3 of [14] )
we obtain
e (−cy) .
Separating the term #X
e (−cy) 
Because (1) and the desired result follows.
Lattices
As in [1] , our results rely on rounding techniques in lattices. We therefore review a few related results and definitions.
Let {b 1 , . . . , b s } be a set of linearly independent vectors in R s . The set of vectors
It has been remarked in Section 2.1 of [8] and then in Section 2.4 of [10] that the following statement holds which is somewhat stronger than that usually used in the literature. 
Proof. The statement is a combination of the Schnorr modification [13] of the lattice basis reduction algorithm of Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász [5] with a result of Kannan [6] about reduction of the closest vector problem to the shortest vector problem.
For integers g and
, we denote by L g,p (x 1 , . . . , x d ) the (d + 1)-dimensional lattice generated by the rows of the fol-
where 
. , x d uniformly and independently at random in the set X b , then with probability
are of the form
with some β ≡ α (mod p).
Proof. As in [1] we define the modular distance between two integers β and γ as
It follows from Lemma 2.3 that for any β and γ such that β ≡ γ (mod p) the probability P (β, γ) of
for an integer x chosen uniformly at random in the set X b is
for some δ > 0, depending only on ε. Thus
provided that p is large enough. Therefore, for any β ≡ α (mod p),
where the probability is taken over integers x 1 , . . . , x d chosen uniformly and independently at random in the set X b .
Since for β ≡ α (mod p) there are only p − 1 possible values for (β rem p), we obtain
The rest of the proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 5 of [1]; we outline it for the sake of completeness.
Let us fix some integers
Let v be a lattice point satisfying
where, as in (3.1),
which contradicts our assumption. As we have seen, condition (3.2) holds with probability exceeding 1 − 2 −n 1/2 and the result follows.
For an integer k ≥ 1 we define f k (t) by the inequalities
Thus, roughly speaking, f k (t) is the integer defined by the k most significant bits of (t rem p).
Using Lemma 3.2 in the same way as Theorem 5 of [1] is used in the proof of Theorem 1, we obtain 
its output satisfies 
, and r d+1 = 0.
Multiplying the last row vector (t 1 , . . . , t d , 1/p) of the matrix (3.1) by α and subtracting certain multiples of p-vectors, we obtain a lattice point
Now we can use Lemma 3.1 (with a slightly rougher constant 2 (d+1)/4 ) to find in polynomial time a lattice vector
where µ = n 1/2 /2 + 3, provided that n is sufficiently large. We also have
Applying Lemma 3.2, we see that v = u α with probability at least 1 − 2 −n 1/2 , and therefore, α can be recovered in polynomial time.
4. Security of the most significant bits of the Shamir scheme
We are ready to prove the main results.
For a positive integer k we suppose that we are given an oracle O k such that for any given values of A, B, C it outputs the k most significant bits of m if the triple (A, B, C) corresponds to a proper usage of the Shamir message passing scheme and an error message, otherwise.
More precisely, given A, B and C, the oracle O k outputs: 
We also put
We remark that
Although the value of b is not known, one can select elements x ∈ X b uniformly and independently at random by querying the oracle O k with the triples 
Remarks
First of all we note that the constants in the above estimates are effective and can be explicitly evaluated.
We have not used the full power of Lemma 3.1 but rather we have applied it with the same constant as in [1] . It is easy to see that in fact the results of [1] as well as our results hold with some k = O n 1/2 log log n log 1/2 n and a slightly large number of oracle calls. We also remark that one can consider an oracle which instead of returning an error message for "inconsistent" inputs (A, B, C) returns just a random element from F p . In this case repeating each query twice one can easily distinguish between an x ∈ X b and other values.
